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Accounting for Regional Poverty Differences in Croatia: Exploring 
the Role of Disparities in Average Income and Inequality 
 
Abstract: 
The prevalence of poverty in a given population is determined by both the level of average 
income and the shape of income distribution. Accordingly, the difference in poverty 
between two populations can be attributed to disparities in their average incomes and in 
the levels of income inequality. In this paper, we decompose the differences in relative 
poverty between each of the twenty-one Croatian counties and Croatia as a whole into the 
contributions of the mean income and income inequality, using the Household Budget 
Survey data for 2010. The decomposition framework that we utilize here is one usually 
applied for decompositions of intertemporal poverty changes, and is based on the concept 
of Shapley value from cooperative game theory. Poverty is measured by three conventional 
measures – the headcount ratio, the poverty gap, and the squared poverty gap – and 
robustness of the results to switching from one measure to another is discussed. The 
results of decompositions show that in most cases both the mean income and inequality 
differences contribute to poverty variation across the counties, relative to poverty in Croatia 
as a whole. When poverty is measured by the headcount ratio, the income contribution 
dominates the inequality contribution, while when we switch to the other two measures, 
which give more weight to the poorer among the poor, the inequality contribution starts to 
dominate. 
 
Keywords: regional poverty, decomposition, income contribution, inequality contribution, 
Shapley value, Croatia 
JEL classification: D31, I32 
 
 
Razlike u siromaštvu na razini regija u Hrvatskoj: uloga razlika 
u prosjeènim dohocima i nejednakostima distribucije dohodaka 
 
Saetak: 
Siromaštvo u danoj populaciji odreðeno je i razinom prosjeènoga dohotka i oblikom 
distribucije dohodaka. U skladu s tim, razlika u siromaštvu izmeðu dviju populacija proizlazi 
iz razlika u njihovim prosjeènim dohocima i razlika u nejednakostima distribucije dohodaka. 
Koristeæi podatke iz Ankete o potrošnji kuæanstava za godinu 2010., u ovome radu razlike u 
relativnom siromaštvu izmeðu svake od dvadeset i jedne hrvatske upanije i cijele Hrvatske 
dekomponiramo na doprinose prosjeènog dohotka i nejednakosti. Okvir za dekompoziciju 
koji koristimo je onaj koji se obièno primjenjuje za dekompozicije intertemporalnih razlika u 
siromaštvu, a zasniva se na konceptu Shapleyeve vrijednosti iz kooperativne teorije igara. 
Siromaštvo mjerimo trima konvencionalnim mjerama – stopom siromaštva, jazom 
siromaštva i kvadriranim jazom siromaštva – te diskutiramo robusnost rezultata s obzirom 
na odabir mjere siromaštva. Rezultati dekompozicija pokazuju da u veæini sluèajeva varijaciji 
siromaštva po upanijama u odnosu na cijelu Hrvatsku doprinose i razlike u prosjeènim 
dohocima i razlike u nejednakostima. U sluèaju kada je siromaštvo mjereno stopom 
siromaštva, uèinak prosjeènoga dohotka dominira nad uèinkom nejednakosti, dok 
prelaskom na druge dvije mjere uèinak nejednakosti poèinje dominirati. 
 
Kljuène rijeèi: regionalno siromaštvo, dekompozicija, doprinos prosjeènog dohotka, 
doprinos nejednakosti, Shapleyeva vrijednost, Hrvatska 
JEL klasifikacija: D31, I32 
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1 Introduction 
 
That the material standard of living in a given population is determined by both the 
average income and income distribution is a well-established fact. Although there is a 
strong negative correlation – both across space (countries, regions within countries) and 
over time – between the level of average income and the prevalence of low living 
standards, the fact that even in the developed world there still are people living in 
poverty suggests that how income is distributed is important as well. Thus, to maximize 
effectiveness of a poverty alleviation program – or, generally, any other policy measure 
aimed at improving the living standards – one should be concerned with both its 
efficiency and equity aspects. The efficiency aspect concerns increasing the average 
income, while the equity aspect is focused on distributive issues, that is, how the 
aggregate income is distributed over the individuals comprising the population. However, 
the two aspects are not always equally important for policy effectiveness, and knowing 
which of them should be given more attention at a given moment requires knowledge of 
how much poverty is due to low income and how much due to income inequality. In 
other words, for a given difference in poverty between two populations, one has to be 
able to measure the respective contributions of differences in the average income and 
inequality. In principle, the fact that one population enjoys higher average income than 
another does not guarantee that poverty is lower in the former population: the higher 
average income may be accompanied by more unequal income distribution, and the net 
outcome may be a higher, rather than lower, poverty level. 
 
In the existing literature, the exercise of decomposing the difference in poverty between 
two populations into the average income and inequality contributions1 is usually 
performed in intertemporal settings; that is, for a given country (or some other spatial 
unit) over time (see, e.g., Kakwani and Subbarao, 1990; Jain and Tendulkar, 1990; Datt 
and Ravallion, 1992; Kakwani, 2000; Baye, 2006; Verme, 2006; Zhang and Wan, 2006; 
Bresson and Labar, 2007). A similar decomposition exercise can, however, also be done in 
spatial settings, by decomposing cross-country or cross-regional (within a country) 
poverty differences. Indeed, there are no conceptual differences between applications in 
intertemporal and spatial settings; the only difference is in interpretation. Yet, besides the 
decomposition of the difference in poverty between India and Brazil in Datt and 
Ravallion (1992), there are surprisingly few spatial applications in the existing literature. 
To the best of our knowledge, the only two papers on the topic are Kolenikov and 
Shorrocks' (2005) and Dhondge's (2005) studies of regional poverty in Russia and India, 
respectively. In this paper, we aim at contributing to the empirical literature on this 
neglected topic by studying regional poverty differences in Croatia. We use the 
Household Budget Survey data for the year 2010 (CBS, 2012) to compare the poverty 
level in each of twenty-one Croatian counties with that at the national level and 
decompose these differences into the contributions of the mean income and income 
inequality. 
                                                 
1 Precise definitions of these two contributions will be given in Section 3. 
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It should be stressed here that we do not deal with the absolute poverty, commonly 
understood as the lack of an absolute amount of material resources (generally, income) 
required to satisfy a set of basic human needs. Instead, we deal with poverty in a relative 
sense. In particular, we are concerned with people who may not be truly, genuinely poor, 
but rather are said to be at risk of poverty.2 Being at risk of poverty does not necessarily 
imply being seriously materially deprived in the sense of lacking income required to be, 
say, well nourished. According to Eurostat’s glossary3, for an individual to be tagged as 
at-risk-of-poverty, it suffices that (s)he commands income “below the at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalized disposable income after 
social transfers”. The European Commission uses the so-called at-risk-of-poverty rate, 
defined as the share of total population that is at risk of poverty, as one of its social 
indicators (see, e.g., Atkinson and Marlier, 2010). So defined, this indicator is obviously 
equivalent to the poverty rate, also known as the headcount poverty ratio or poverty incidence, 
where the poverty line is relative,4 equal to 60 percent of the equivalized median income. 
In our empirical analysis, we decompose the regional differences in the at-risk-of-poverty 
incidence into the portions attributed to the differences in the mean equivalized income 
and inequality of its distribution.  
 
Selecting one poverty5 measure instead of another is a normative choice which can, in 
principle, affect the results of the analysis. In order to check the robustness of our results, 
we also consider two measures other than the poverty headcount ratio, namely the poverty 
gap (also known as poverty depth) and the squared poverty gap (also known as poverty severity). 
All three indicators belong to the so-called FGT class of poverty measures introduced by 
Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) and are commonly used in the poverty 
decomposition literature.6 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The decomposition framework is presented 
in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, the three poverty measures we use are described. In 
Section 4, we describe the Household Budget Survey data. Section 5 contains some 
descriptive evidence on poverty, the mean income and inequality across the twenty-one 
Croatian counties. In Section 6 we give the results of decompositions and discuss them. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
2 These, of course, include the genuinely poor as well, if any. 
3 Statistics Explained (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/). 
4 Unlike an absolute poverty line, whose real value is fixed over time and as such independent of distributional 
changes, a relative poverty line is dependent upon the income distribution, for it is usually set equal to a proportion of 
the mean or the median income. 
5 For expositional simplicity, throughout the rest of the paper we will drop the prefix “at-risk-of” and refer just to 
“poverty”. This does not entail any conceptual changes. 
6 Exact formal definitions of these measures will be given later. 
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2 Decomposition Framework 
 
We use the decomposition framework pioneered by Kakwani and Subbarao (1990) and 
Jain and Tendulkar (1990), and afterwards more rigorously analyzed by Datt and 
Ravallion (1992), Kakwani (2000) and Shorrocks (2011). They all used it in intertemporal 
settings, namely to decompose the poverty change between two years into what they call 
the “growth” and “redistribution” contributions. The framework can, however, be equally 
well used in spatial settings, that is, to decompose the difference in poverty between two 
countries or regions7 at a given year (see Kolenikov and Shorrocks, 2005; Dhondge, 
2005). For spatial applications, the growth and redistribution contributions should be 
appropriately renamed. Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2005) use the terms “income” instead 
of “growth” and “inequality” instead of “redistribution”, and in this paper we will use 
this terminology as well. The renaming seems obvious enough: while the terms “growth” 
and “redistribution” are suggestive of a dynamic nature of applications in intertemporal 
settings, the terms “income” and “inequality” reflect on the other hand a static nature of 
spatial applications. 
 
Consider two regions, indexed by  1,2r . The poverty level in region r, denoted by rP , 
is a function of the income vector 1( ,..., ,..., )
r
r
r r r r n
i ny y y y  , and the fixed8 poverty line 
z  : 
 
( , )y rrP P z . (1) 
 
Since our aim is to decompose the difference in poverty between two regions into the 
contributions of the differences in mean incomes and inequality levels, it is useful to 
rewrite (1) as 
 
( , )πr r rP P  , (2) 
 
where we use the fact that any income distribution y r  is fully characterized by its mean 
r  and the parameters of the Lorenz curve, denoted by the vector πr . Also, since the 
poverty line is the same for both regions, we drop it for the sake of notational simplicity. 
Poverty difference between the two regions is then expressed as 
 
2 1 2 2 1 1( , ) ( , )π πP P P P P      . (3) 
 
Since the poverty line is fixed, a given difference in poverty can be only due to the 
difference in the mean income, 2 1     , or due to the difference in the level of 
inequality, 2 1π π π   . The portion of P  that comes from the difference in mean 
                                                 
7 Or any other spatial units that one finds appropriate. 
8 That is, the poverty line is the same for both regions, 1 2z z z  . 
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incomes, with inequality fixed at the level in the reference region (either of the two)9, is 
called the pure income effect (contribution), and the portion that is due to the difference in 
the level of inequality, with the mean income fixed at the reference region’s level, is the 
pure inequality effect (contribution).10 
 
If we take region 1 as the reference region, that is, if we fix inequality at its level in region 
1, the corresponding income effect, G1, is formally defined as follows: 
 
1 2 1 1 1( , ) ( , )π πG P P   . (4)  
 
By the same token, fixing the mean income at the level of region 1, the inequality effect, 
I1, is given by 
 
1 1 2 1 1( , ) ( , )π πI P P   . (5)  
 
Choosing region 2 instead of region 1 as the reference is, however, no less legitimate. The 
corresponding income and inequality effects are, respectively, 
 
2 2 2 1 2( , ) ( , )π πG P P   , (6) 
 
and 
 
2 2 2 2 1( , ) ( , )π πI P P   . (7) 
 
Generally, there is no a priori reason why choosing one region as the reference would be 
better than choosing the other, and the choice is therefore fully arbitrary. Datt and 
Ravallion (1992) noticed that if the function P is not additively separable11 in the mean 
income and the level of inequality, the income and inequality effects computed with one 
region as the reference are not equal to those computed with the other region as the 
reference. And since poverty measures generally are not additively separable, the 
implication is that whichever region is chosen as the reference, the resulting 
decomposition will be inexact in the sense that, besides the income and inequality effects, 
there will also be a residual, R, equal to the difference between the income (or inequality) 
effects computed for different choices of the reference region. For example, taking 1r  , 
one gets the decomposition 
 
1 1 1P G I R    , (8) 
 
                                                 
9 To be precise, the reference can be chosen completely arbitrarily, meaning that it can be any region other than the two 
being compared. Indeed, the reference need not be observed in reality; that is, it can be fully artificial. However, the 
latter possibility, although logically perfectly legitimate, does not seem to be defensible on intuitive grounds. 
10 The adjective “pure” is to be understood as ceteris paribus. In the remainder of the paper, we will drop it and call the 
effects “income effect” and “inequality effect”. We will also use the words “effect” and “contribution” interchangeably 
throughout the paper. 
11 A function is additively separable in its arguments if its first order derivative with respect to any of the arguments is 
not a function of any of its other arguments; in other words, if all its cross partial derivatives are zero. For example, the 
function ( , )f u v  is additively separable in u and v if 2 / 0f u v    . 
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where 1 2 1 2 1R G G I I    . It is easy to check that for 2r   the corresponding residual 
is 2 1R R  . In their empirical application, Datt and Ravallion (1992) found that the 
residual is not negligible: indeed, in some cases it accounted even for 50 percent of P . 
 
It is important to realize at this point that the existence of the residual, irrespective of its 
size, is not a consequence of leaving out some components other than the differences in 
the mean incomes and inequality levels, but rather a pure accounting failure. In other 
words, the residual must be fully comprised of those parts of the true income and 
inequality effects that are not properly accounted for by choosing either region as the 
reference. This is implied by the fact that, once we fix the poverty line, the differences in 
the mean incomes and levels of inequality must be the only sources of the difference in 
poverty between two regions.12 
 
That said, in order to solve the issue of residual, one may proceed in one of two different 
ways. One involves trying to better approximate the income and inequality effects. This is 
done in Bresson (2008a; 2008b) who used a decomposition procedure based on integral 
calculus, proposed recently by Müller (2008). Alternatively, one may decide to apportion 
the residual between the income and inequality effects in a certain way. It is a common 
practice in the decomposition literature that the residual be divided between the two 
effects so that each of them gets one half of it. In the present paper, we will also pursue 
this common practice.  
 
There are two justifications for such “fifty-fifty” division rule. Kakwani (2000) proposed 
an axiomatic decomposition framework based on the following axioms: (i) if one of the 
effects is zero, the total poverty difference must be equal to the other effect; (ii) if both 
effects are (weakly) positive/negative, the total poverty difference must be (weakly) 
positive/negative; (iii) the income and inequality effects obtained in the decomposition 
of 2 1P P P   , must be of the same absolute magnitude, but of the opposite sign, as 
those obtained in the decomposition of 1 2P P P   . These axioms are shown to imply 
that the two effects should be calculated by averaging their values obtained with different 
reference regions. Therefore, the income and inequality effects are, respectively, 
 
   1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 21 1 1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )2 2 2 2π π π πG G G P P P P          (9) 
 
and 
 
   1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 11 1 1 1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )2 2 2 2π π π πI I I P P P P         . (10) 
 
By rearranging (9) and (10), one can show that G and I contain a half of the residual 
each, so that the following equalities hold: 
 
                                                 
12 For decompositions where the poverty line is also allowed to vary, and thus can be an additional source of poverty 
differences, see, for example, Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2000; 2005) and Deutsch and Silber (2011). 
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1 1 2 2
1 1
2 2
G G R G R    , (11) 
 
1 1 2 2
1 1
2 2
I I R I R    . (12) 
 
The expressions (9) and (10) are also derived by Shorrocks (2011) in a decomposition 
framework based on the Shapley value. The Shapley value is a concept imported from 
cooperative game theory, and it indicates the portion of total output that each player in a 
cooperative game is to be given. It is equal to the average marginal contribution of a 
player to all possible coalitions (s)he can form with other players (Shapley, 1953).13 In a 
“decomposition game”, there are two “players”, namely the effects of income and 
inequality, and the “output” is the total poverty difference. It turns out that the Shapley 
values of the income and inequality effects are given by (9) and (10), respectively.  
 
In the expressions (9) and (10), four different poverty levels appear. Two of them are 
always observed from the data: 1 1( , )πP   is the level of poverty in region 1, and 
2 2( , )πP   in region 2. The remaining two, 1 2( , )πP   and 2 1( , )πP  , are unobserved. 
The former corresponds to the counterfactual income distribution whose mean is equal 
to that in the income distribution of region 1, 1y , and whose Lorenz curve is identical to 
that in the income distribution of region 2, 2y . For the latter poverty level, it is exactly 
the other way around: it measures poverty corresponding to the distribution with the 
mean income and the Lorenz curve equal to those in the distributions 2y  and 1y , 
respectively.  
 
The two counterfactual distributions are easily constructed using the fact that the 
inequality level in a given income distribution is scale-invariant, that is, it does not 
change when all incomes get multiplied by the same number. It follows then that the 
counterfactual distribution with mean 1  and the Lorenz curve parameters 2π  is the 
distribution   211 yg  , where 2 11g    is the relative difference between the two 
regions' mean incomes. Similarly, the counterfactual distribution characterized by 2  
and 1π  is the distribution 1(1 ) yg  . Using the notation for the poverty measure as in 
(1), the Shapley income and inequality effects are expressed as, respectively, 
 
  1 1 2 2111 1((1 ) , ) ( , ) ( , )2 2y y y ygG P g z P z P z P              (13) 
 
and 
 
  2 1 2 1111 1, ( , ) ( , ) ((1 ) , )2 2y y y ygI P z P z P z P g z            . (14) 
 
                                                 
13 For an overview of the Shapley value, see The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, second edition (2008), s.v. “Shapley 
Value” (by Sergiu Hart). 
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These two formulas will be used in the decomposition exercise that we perform in the 
remainder of the paper. 
 
 
3 Poverty Measures 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, we use three poverty measures that are commonly 
used in the decomposition literature, as well as in the empirical literature on poverty 
measurement in general. They all belong to the so-called FGT class of measures, 
introduced by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984). In this section we define them 
formally.  
 
For a discrete income distribution y of size n,14 a poverty measure from the FGT class is 
given by 
 
1
1( , ) max ,0y
n
i
i
z yFGT z
n z



        , (15) 
 
where   is a non-negative parameter, usually interpreted as indicating the degree of 
“poverty aversion”. By changing the value of  , one obtains different poverty measures 
which capture different aspects of poverty. The three measures that we use correspond to 
0  , 1   and 2  .  
 
For 0  , (15) gives the headcount poverty ratio or poverty incidence – the proportion of 
total population below the poverty line: 
 
0
0
1
1( , ) max ,0y
n
i
i
z yFGT z
n z
        . (16) 
 
With 1  , (15) gives another common poverty measure – the poverty gap or poverty depth: 
 
1
1
1( , ) max ,0y
n
i
i
z yFGT z
n z
     . (17) 
 
It measures the average shortfall of the poor people’s incomes from the poverty line, 
expressed as a percentage of the poverty line, where the average is taken over the whole 
population of the region, not just over the population below the poverty line. 
Alternatively, one may understand it as a “weighted headcount ratio”, where the relative 
gap ( ) /iz y z  is the weight assigned to individual i. This interpretation makes clear that, 
in comparison with the headcount ratio, the poverty gap gives more weight to poorer 
people. In other words, not all individuals below the poverty line contribute equally to 
the aggregate poverty: the poorer the person, the more (s)he contributes to the aggregate 
                                                 
14 For the sake of notational simplicity, in this section we drop the superscript r, indicating region, from the income 
vector yr and its size nr. 
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poverty. It can also be shown that the functional relation between the poverty gap and 
the headcount ratio is 1 0( , ) ( , ) ( ) /y y zFGT z FGT z z z   , where z  is the average 
income of people below the poverty line z in distribution y. It follows that for two 
distributions with the same headcount ratio, the one in which the average of the poor is 
higher, and therefore closer to the poverty line, will have lower poverty measured by the 
poverty gap.  
 
The last poverty measure that we use is obtained by setting 2  , which gives us the 
squared poverty gap or poverty severity: 
 
2
2
1
1( , ) max ,0y
n
i
i
z yFGT z
n z
        . (18) 
 
In comparison with the poverty gap, relative shortfalls of individual incomes from the 
poverty line are here squared, meaning that these shortfalls are weighted by themselves. 
Unlike the headcount ratio and the poverty gap, this measure is sensitive to income 
inequality among the poor. This can be seen from the fact that it can be expressed as 
   2 22 0( , ) ( , ) 1z zz zz zFGT z FGT z           y y , where   is the coefficient of variation 
of incomes below the poverty line, measuring thus inequality among the poor (Foster, 
Greer and Thorbecke, 1984; Ravallion, 1994).15 So, if two regions have the same poverty 
gap, the one with more unequal incomes among the poor will have more poverty 
according to this measure. This does not mean that the headcount ratio and the poverty 
gap are not sensitive to overall inequality; they are sensitive to the measure of inequality 
for the whole population, but not to inequality of incomes below the poverty line. Just 
like the poverty gap, the squared poverty gap can also be understood as a “weighted 
headcount ratio”, with the squared gap, 2(( ) / )iz y z , being used as the weight of person 
i. Thus, this measure gives greater weight to the poorest among the poor.16 
 
 
4 Data 
 
The empirical analysis in this paper is based upon the household micro data from the 
nationally representative Household Budget Survey (HBS) for 2010 (CBS, 2012). The 
survey is conducted on a yearly basis by the Croatian Bureau of Statistics in accordance 
                                                 
15 Later on, when we present decomposition results for the squared poverty gap, we report inequality below the poverty 
line across the twenty-one counties (Figure 8), but we use a more conventional measure of inequality, the Gini 
coefficient, instead of the coefficient of variation. The former can be shown to be an increasing function of the latter 
(Milanović, 1997):
 
( , ) / 3Gini corr y ry  , where ry is the rank of income y when incomes are ordered from the 
lowest to the highest, and ( , )corr    is the coefficient of correlation. 
16 As   becomes bigger, the corresponding FGT measures get increasingly more sensitive to the incomes at the very 
bottom of the distribution. In the limit, as   approaches infinity, one obtains a “Rawlsian” poverty measure (Rawls, 
1971) which considers only the poorest person in the distribution. Comparing poverty levels between two distributions 
then amounts to comparing the income gap of the poorest person in one region with that of the poorest person in the 
other region or, equivalently, comparing incomes of the poorest persons in the respective distributions. 
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with methodological recommendations of Eurostat. It contains data on household 
expenditures, income sources and various socioeconomic characteristics.  
 
The unit of observation in our empirical analysis is an individual. His or her individual 
living standard is measured by the household income per adult equivalent. Total 
household income is adjusted using the modified OECD equivalence scale (Hagenaars, 
De Vos and Zaidi, 1994). This equivalence scale accounts for household composition by 
assigning the following weights to household members: 1 to the household head, 0.5 to 
each additional adult, and 0.3 to each child, where a person is considered to be a child if 
(s)he is aged 14 or less. Unfortunately, we are not able to take into account regional 
variation in cost of living, for the data on regional price variation is not published by the 
Croatian Bureau of Statistics.  
 
Regarding the sampling design of the HBS, it is a two-step stratified sample, the twenty-
one counties being the strata. In total, there are 9,631 individuals living in 3,461 
households, which is about 0.23 percent of the total population. The response rate at the 
household level is 61 percent.17 Unfortunately, for confidentiality reasons, the Croatian 
Bureau of Statistics does not provide data users with information on which household 
belongs to which of the 650 clusters, so we cannot account for clustering in computing 
the standard errors of our estimates. In all estimations we apply the set of individual 
weights. 
 
 
5 Poverty, Income and Inequality across Counties 
 
Before turning to decomposition of regional poverty differences into the mean income 
and inequality components, here we first present some descriptive figures on poverty, 
average income and inequality for the twenty-one counties considered. These are given in 
Table 1.  
 
Let us start with the poverty measures.18 Panels A, B and C of Figure 1 show the 
headcount ratios (FGT0), the poverty gaps (FGT1) and the squared poverty gaps (FGT2), 
respectively, from Table 1. The poverty line is set to 60 percent of the median equivalized 
annual income for Croatia as a whole and equals 25,260 Croatian kuna (about 3,420 
euros).19 The headcount ratio ranges from below 10 percent in Istra, City of Zagreb, 
Dubrovnik-Neretva, Primorje-Gorski Kotar and Krapina-Zagorje, to more than 45 percent 
in Karlovac and Virovitica-Podravina. The figure for Croatia as a whole is 17.720, with 
                                                 
17 For more details on the sampling design, see CBS (2012). 
18 Values of all the three poverty measures, obtained using formulas (16), (17), and (18) are multiplied by 100. 
19 According to the average HRK/EUR exchange rate in 2010. 
20 It should be said that this figure is lower than the official one, 20.6, published by the Croatian Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS, 2012). The likely reason is that the official figure is based on different data, namely the Croatian version of the 
Household Income Survey data, which is supposed to be fully compatible with the European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Unfortunately, these data are still unavailable for research purposes outside 
the Croatian Bureau of Statistics. 
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eight counties below that level and thirteen above it. The former comprise more than 
half of the total population (about 56 percent), a consequence of three biggest cities being 
located within these counties: Zagreb (coincides with City of Zagreb), Split (in Split-
Dalmacija) and Rijeka (in Primorje-Gorski Kotar). Most other counties have headcount 
ratios between 10 and 30 percent. 
 
 
Table 1  Basic Statistics for the Twenty-one Counties 
 
Population 
share, % 
Headcount 
ratio (FGT0) 
Poverty 
gap 
(FGT1) 
Squared 
poverty 
gap 
(FGT2) 
Mean  
equivalized 
income  
(CRO=100) 
Gini 
coefficient 
Zagreb (ZG) 7.3 16.7 4.2 1.7 106 25.5 
Krapina-Zagorje (KZ) 3.1 9.6 2.1 0.7 100 22.5 
Sisak-Moslavina (SM) 4.1 37.4 19.0 13.2 73 35.9 
Karlovac (KA) 3.0 45.8 25.7 18.6 66 42.1 
Varadin (VA) 4.1 20.0 5.4 2.4 88 24.9 
Koprivnica-Krievci (KK) 2.8 24.7 6.0 2.2 95 29.1 
Bjelovar-Bilogora (BB) 2.9 19.9 8.2 4.6 86 28.5 
Primorje-Gorski Kotar (PG) 6.9 9.5 2.9 1.7 110 26.2 
Lika-Senj (LS) 1.2 22.7 5.9 2.3 89 24.7 
Virovitica-Podravina (VP) 2.1 47.5 14.7 6.8 69 30.7 
Poega-Slavonija (PS) 1.8 28.3 4.0 0.9 77 20.4 
Brod-Posavina (BP) 3.9 21.3 7.7 3.4 91 29.7 
Zadar (ZD) 3.8 20.7 5.0 2.3 92 27.8 
Osijek-Baranja (OB) 7.4 19.5 5.6 2.3 95 28.7 
Šibenik-Knin (SK) 2.6 27.0 8.4 4.1 90 31.4 
Vukovar-Srijem (VS) 4.4 26.0 7.7 3.3 85 29.5 
Split-Dalmacija (SD) 10.7 16.3 6.4 4.2 96 29.2 
Istra (IS) 4.8 3.9 1.2 0.8 127 24.7 
Dubrovnik-Neretva (DN) 2.9 9.3 4.9 4.2 111 26.4 
Meðimurje (ME) 2.6 12.0 3.4 1.5 98 22.4 
City of Zagreb (CZ) 17.7 7.9 2.8 1.6 122 27.9 
Croatia (CRO) 100.0 17.7 6.1 3.4 100 29.3 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010.  
Note: Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. 
 
 
As for FGT1, at the national level it is 6.1 percent, meaning that at the aggregate level the 
average21 shortfall of poor people’s incomes from the poverty line is 6.1 percent. Now 
that more weight is given to the poorer among the poor, thirteen counties (comprising 
about 66 percent of the total population) are below that figure. Of these thirteen 
counties, seven are those that also have the headcount ratio below the national level. This 
indicates that in five counties that have a higher share of the poor than Croatia as a 
whole, the poverty gap is higher compared to that for Croatia as a whole. Or, in other 
words, the average poor person’s income in each of these five counties is closer to the 
                                                 
21 Recall from Section 3 that the average is taken over the whole population, not just over those below the poverty line. 
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poverty line than the income of the average poor person in the whole country. Similarly, 
using FGT2 to measure poverty, one can give even more weight to the poorer among the 
poor. In this case, in comparison to what we had when FGT1 was used, one additional 
county becomes better ranked than Croatia as a whole. 
 
Figure 1  Poverty across the Twenty-one Counties 
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Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: On each panel, the estimates are shown as the heights of the circles. The crosses above and below each of the estimates 
represent the bounds of a 95-percent confidence interval, based on asymptotic standard errors. Incomes are equivalized 
using the modified OECD equivalence scale. For full names of the counties, see Table 1. 
 
 
Besides the rerankings of counties relative to the whole of Croatia, induced by switching 
from one poverty measure to another, there are also many rerankings among counties 
relative to each other. These are shown in Table 2, where the rankings are made so that 
lower ranks mean lower poverty. We see that no county is equally ranked by all three 
poverty measures. Although a number of rerankings, especially small ones, are likely due 
to imprecision of the estimates, some of them are certainly too big to be explained this 
way. For instance, Dubrovnik-Neretva is ranked third by FGT0, eighth by FGT1 and 
eighteenth by FGT2. An opposite example is Požega-Slavonija whose rank, upon 
switching from FGT0 to FGT1, declines from eighteenth to sixth place. This non-
robustness of poverty rankings to switching from one poverty measure to another 
suggests that the character of poverty is different across counties: the fact that one county 
has higher poverty than another when poverty is measured by FGT0 does not necessarily 
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mean that this is so when the other two measures are used. As we will see later on, this 
will also affect the results of decomposition of poverty differences into the mean income 
and inequality components. 
 
Table 2  Poverty Rankings for Different Poverty Measures 
 Rank by FGT0 Rank by FGT1 Rank by FGT2 
IS 1 1 1 
CZ 2 3 5 
DN 3 8 18 
PG 4 4 6 
KZ 5 2 1 
ME 6 5 4 
SD 7 15 17 
ZG 8 7 7 
CRO 9 14 15 
OB 10 11 10 
BB 11 18 19 
VA 12 10 12 
ZD 13 9 9 
BP 14 17 14 
LS 15 12 11 
KK 16 13 8 
VS 17 16 13 
SK 18 19 16 
PS 19 6 3 
SM 20 21 21 
KA 21 22 22 
VP 22 20 20 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: For each of the three poverty measures, rankings are such that the county with the lowest value of the respective 
poverty measure is ranked as first (rank = 1). Rankings are based on the values of the three poverty measures given in 
Table 1. The grey-colored cells in the table indicate equal ranking by different poverty measures. For full names of the 
counties, see Table 1. 
 
 
Concerning the average equivalized income, it varies from 66 percent of the national 
average in Karlovac to 127 percent in Istra. In 15 counties, populated by about 57 
percent of the total population, the average income is below the national level. 
Expectedly, correlation with each of the poverty measures is negative, as shown in Figure 
2. The correlation with the poverty headcount ratio (panel A) is stronger than with the 
other two measures (panels B and C), suggesting that the average income is better at 
predicting the share of people below the poverty line than at predicting the average 
shortfall of incomes from the poverty line, be it squared or not. To this point, note that 
of all the counties with the mean income below the national mean only two have their 
headcount ratios below the national level. And all the counties whose mean income is 
above the national level are also less poor, according to the headcount ratio, than the 
nation as a whole. 
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Figure 2  Correlation between the Mean Income and the Three Poverty Measures 
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Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. The horizontal (vertical) reference line 
indicates the value of the statistic on the vertical (horizontal) axis for Croatia as a whole. For full names of the counties, 
see Table 1. 
 
 
As regards income inequality, the Gini coefficient ranges from 20.4 in Požega-Slavonija to 
42.1 in Karlovac. For Croatia as a whole, it is 29.3, with fifteen counties having less 
unequal income distribution. In Figure 3, we observe positive relationships between the 
Gini coefficient and all three poverty measures, indicating that counties with more 
unequal income distributions tend to have higher poverty as well. Contrary to what we 
had in the case of average income, the Gini coefficient is correlated more strongly with 
FGT1 and FGT2 than with FGT0. In other words, it is better at predicting the average 
shortfall of incomes from the poverty line than at predicting the share of individuals 
below the poverty line. The same can be concluded by observing that if poverty is 
measured by FGT1 or FGT2, almost all the counties with income distribution less 
unequal than the national distribution are also less poor than the nation as a whole, 
which is not the case when FGT0 is used.  
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Figure 3  Correlation between the Gini Coefficient and the Three Poverty Measures 
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Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. The horizontal (vertical) reference line 
indicates the value of the statistic on the vertical (horizontal) axis for Croatia as a whole. For full names of the counties, 
see Table 1.  
 
 
6 Decomposition Results 
 
In this section we present the results of decompositions of regional poverty differences. 
For the sake of expositional simplicity, regional decompositions are performed in the 
following way. Rather than computing the income and inequality effects of regional 
poverty differences for each pair of counties, which would be cumbersome given that 
there are 210 pairs, we take Croatia as a whole to be the benchmark “region” and 
compare each of the twenty-one counties with the national benchmark.22 In all 
decompositions, Croatia as a whole will be treated as region 1. Referring to the formulas 
(13) and (14) from the previous section, y1 is the income vector for Croatia as a whole, 
while y2 is the vector of incomes for any of the twenty-one counties.  
 
Note that even if we chose to decompose the poverty differences between each pair of 
counties, it would nevertheless be warranted to complement such analysis with what we 
actually do here. The reason is that the approach we have chosen seems to be more policy 
relevant, for it provides one with evidence which may be of help while deciding on 
                                                 
22 The results of 210 pairwise decompositions are available upon request. 
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whether some region-specific policies for poverty reduction would be more purposeful 
than policies designed for the whole country. 
 
 
6.1 Results for the Headcount Poverty 
 
We first present the results for the case where poverty is measured by the headcount ratio, 
FGT0. The estimates of poverty differences, along with the income and inequality 
contributions are given in Table 3 and graphed in Figure 4. 
 
Table 3  Decomposition Results for the Headcount Ratio 
 
Total poverty difference 
(ΔP) 
Income contribution 
(G) 
Inequality contribution 
(I) 
Istra (IS) -13.8 -7.8 -6.0 
City of Zagreb (CZ) -9.9 -6.6 -3.3 
Dubrovnik-Neretva (DN) -8.4 -4.1 -4.3 
Primorje-Gorski Kotar (PG) -8.2 -3.1 -5.1 
Krapina-Zagorje (KZ) -8.1 -0.1 -8.0 
Meðimurje (ME) -5.7 0.4 -6.1 
Split-Dalmacija (SD) -1.4 1.5 -2.9 
Zagreb (ZG) -1.0 -2.2 1.2 
Osijek-Baranja (OB) 1.7 1.5 0.2 
Bjelovar-Bilogora (BB) 2.2 4.6 -2.4 
Varadin (VA) 2.3 6.8 -4.5 
Zadar (ZD) 3.0 4.6 -1.6 
Brod-Posavina (BP) 3.5 2.5 1.0 
Lika-Senj (LS) 5.0 6.1 -1.1 
Koprivnica-Krievci (KK) 7.0 3.0 4.0 
Vukovar-Srijem (VS) 8.2 6.9 1.3 
Šibenik-Knin (SK) 9.2 5.5 3.7 
Poega-Slavonija (PS) 10.6 17.4 -6.8 
Sisak-Moslavina (SM) 19.7 14.0 5.7 
Karlovac (KA) 28.0 19.0 9.0 
Virovitica-Podravina (VP) 29.8 23.8 6.0 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Decomposition is based on the Shapley value approach, using formulas (13) and (14), where the poverty measure P 
is the headcount ratio (FGT0). Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. Boldface figures are 
statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level; statistical significance is assessed based on asymptotic standard errors. 
 
 
To illustrate how the estimated figures should be interpreted, let us take the City of 
Zagreb as an example. The City of Zagreb is the nation's capital and a county itself. With 
the mean income 22 percent above the national level, it is one of the most affluent 
counties; there is only one county, namely Istra, with higher mean income. As far as 
income inequality is concerned, the Gini coefficient of 27.9 is below the one for Croatia 
as a whole, and in comparison to the Ginis for all the twenty-one counties, 27.9 is the 
median value. The figure -9.9 in Table 3 means that the headcount ratio is 9.9 percentage 
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points lower in the City of Zagreb than at the national level. This total difference in 
poverty is decomposed into the income and inequality contributions, equal to -6.6 and    
-3.3, respectively. In Table 4, we show exactly how these two figures are computed. 
 
Figure 4  Decomposition Results for the Headcount Ratio 
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Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Decomposition is based on the Shapley value approach, using formulas (13) and (14), where the poverty measure P 
is the headcount ratio (FGT0). Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. For full names of the 
counties, see Table 1. 
 
 
Table 4  Calculating the Income and Inequality Contributions 
 Reference: 
Croatia as a whole 
Reference: 
City of Zagreb 
Shapley value approach 
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
Total poverty difference ΔP = -9.9 ΔP = -9.9 ΔP = -9.9 
Income contribution G1 = -6.4 G2 = -6.8 G = 0.5 · (-6.4) + 0.5 · (-6.8) = -6.6 
Inequality contribution I1 = -3.1 I2 = -3.5 I = 0.5 · (-3.1) + 0.5 · (-3.5) = -3.3 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
 
 
If one takes the whole country as the reference (column (i)), applying formulas (4) and (5) 
gives, respectively, G1 = -6.4 (income effect) and I1 = -3.1 (inequality effect). G1 = -6.4     
(I1 = -3.1) is interpreted as follows: if income inequality (the mean income) in the City of 
Zagreb rose (fell) to the level for Croatia as a whole, holding at the same time the mean 
income (income inequality) unchanged, the headcount ratio would be 6.4 (3.1) percentage 
points lower for the City of Zagreb than for the whole country. One can analogously 
interpret G2 = -6.8 and I2 = -3.5 (column (ii)), obtained using formulas (6) and (7), 
respectively. In column (iii), the Shapley value-based income effect G = -6.6 is obtained 
by averaging G1 and G2 (formula (9)), and the Shapley value-based inequality effect        
I = -3.3 by averaging I1 and I2 (formula (10)). The effects are of the same sign – both are 
negative – meaning that they reinforce one another in reducing the headcount ratio in 
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the City of Zagreb below that for the entire country. In a qualitative sense, this result was 
expected and could have been predicted on the basis of Table 1: the mean income is 
notably higher and the Gini coefficient is lower in the City of Zagreb than in Croatia as 
a whole. 
 
Another example of a county where the two effects reinforce each other is Karlovac. 
Here, however, both the income and inequality effects are positive, equal to 19 and 9 
percentage points, respectively, so that the total excess of the headcount ratio in Karlovac 
over the national one is 28 percentage points. Again, such a result could have been 
guessed by referring to Table 1 which shows that Karlovac has lower mean income and 
more unequal income distribution than the nation as a whole.  
 
Finally, take the example of Požega-Slavonija where the effects work against each other: 
the headcount ratio in this county would be 17.4 percentage points above the national 
level if there were no inequality effect of the opposite sign which partly offsets the 
income effect. On net, the two effects yield the headcount ratio for Požega-Slavonija 
which is 10.6 percentage points higher than that for Croatia as a whole. Again, since the 
mean income in this county is lower than the national mean income and its income 
distribution is more unequal than that for the entire country (see Table 1), it comes as no 
surprise that the income and inequality effects work against one another. 
 
In Table 3 and Figure 4, counties are ordered from the least poor to the poorest. The 
total poverty difference, relative to Croatia as a whole, ranges from -13.8 for Istra as the 
least poor county to 29.8 for the poorest county, Virovitica-Podravina. Only differences 
greater than 5 percentage points in absolute value – thirteen out of twenty-one – are 
statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level. Regarding the income and 
inequality effects, note first that in most decompositions (thirteen out of twenty-one) the 
two effects have the same sign. This is more pronounced if we consider only the cases in 
which both effects are statistically different from zero: out of eleven such cases, in eight 
the effects are of the same sign. Among these eight cases, four are the least poor counties 
(Istra, City of Zagreb, Dubrovnik-Neretva, Primorje-Gorski Kotar, Krapina-Zagorje), three 
are the poorest counties (Sisak-Moslavina, Karlovac, Virovitica-Podravina), with only one 
between the extremes (Koprivnica-Križevci). This indicates that the income and inequality 
effects tend to reinforce one another, rather than operating in opposite directions, 
especially in most and least poor counties. A reason for this pattern lies in negative 
correlation between the mean income and inequality: on average, poorer counties have 
also more unequal income distributions.23 Counties where the two effects are of opposite 
signs tend to be those with poverty levels that are not significantly different from the 
national level (e.g., Split-Dalmacija, Zagreb, Bjelovar-Bilogora, Varaždin): obviously 
enough, statistically significant income and inequality effects must operate against each 
other to yield an insignificant total poverty difference. 
 
                                                 
23 Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2005), who decomposed poverty differences between Russian regions, found the opposite: 
poorer regions tend to have lower inequality. 
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Comparing the absolute values of the two effects, we observe that in most cases (fifteen 
out of twenty-one) the income effect dominates the inequality effect. Of the six counties 
for which the opposite holds, that is, where the inequality effect dominates, five of them 
are less poor than Croatia as a whole. In addition, among the fifteen counties where the 
income effect dominates, dominance is on average greater for poorer counties. This is in 
accordance with the fact that the negative correlation between FGT0 and the average 
income (Figure 2, panel A) is stronger than the positive correlation between FGT0 and 
the Gini coefficient (Figure 3, panel A). Another way to show this is by plotting total 
poverty change against the income and inequality contributions. Figure 5 shows that 
positive correlation with the total poverty change with the income contribution (panel A) 
is higher than with the inequality contribution (panel B). Thus, when poverty is 
measured by the headcount ratio, regional differences in the mean income are better than 
regional inequality differences at predicting poverty differences. 
 
Figure 5  Correlation between the Total Difference in the Headcount Ratio and the Income 
and Inequality Contributions 
KA
VPcorrelation coefficient = 0.94 KA
VPcorrelation coefficient = 0.81
ZG
KZ
SM
VA
KK
BB
PG
LS
PS
BP ZDOB
SKVS
SD
IS
DN
ME
CZ
-10 0 10 20 30
Income contribution for FGT0
ZG
KZ
SM
VA
KK
BB
PG
LS
PS
BPZD OB
SKVS
SD
IS
DN
ME
CZ
-10 -5 0 5 10
Inequality contribution for FGT0
3
20
1
0
-1
0
0
0
To
ta
l p
ov
er
ty
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 fo
r F
G
T0
3
20
1
0
-1
0
0
0
To
ta
l p
ov
er
ty
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 fo
r F
G
T0
A. Total poverty change vs. income contribution B. Total poverty change vs. inequality contribution
 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. For full names of the counties, see Table 1. 
 
 
One can conclude that when poverty is measured by the headcount ratio, that is, by the 
proportion of population below the poverty line, the income contribution to total 
poverty differences generally dominates the inequality contribution. Although there are 
cases in which the inequality contribution is dominant, those are rather rare. This result 
seems to confirm to some extent the conventional intuition that the main determinant 
of poverty in a region within a country is that region's average income as an indicator of 
the average living standard. However, despite the domination of the income 
contribution, the size of the inequality contribution is not small enough to be neglected. 
In most of the twenty-one counties, the contribution of inequality to the difference in 
their poverty relative to national poverty is of a significant magnitude. Moreover, there 
seems to exist a clear pattern: counties with higher average income also tend to have more 
equal income distribution. 
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6.2 Results for the Poverty Gap 
 
After decomposing differences in the headcount ratio (FGT0), here we perform 
decomposition of the poverty gap (FGT1). The estimates are displayed in Table 5 and 
Figure 6. Interpretation of the figures follows the logic explained in Table 4, the only 
difference being that here poverty is measured by FGT1 instead of by FGT0. 
 
Table 5  Decomposition Results for the Poverty Gap 
 
Total poverty difference 
(ΔP) 
Income contribution 
(G) 
Inequality contribution 
(I) 
Istra (IS) -4.9 -1.8 -3.2 
Krapina-Zagorje (KZ) -4.0 0.0 -4.0 
City of Zagreb (CZ) -3.3 -1.7 -1.6 
Primorje-Gorski Kotar (PG) -3.2 -0.9 -2.3 
Meðimurje (ME) -2.7 0.2 -2.8 
Poega-Slavonija (PS) -2.1 3.7 -5.9 
Zagreb (ZG) -1.9 -0.7 -1.2 
Dubrovnik-Neretva (DN) -1.2 -0.9 -0.3 
Zadar (ZD) -1.1 1.1 -2.2 
Varadin (VA) -0.7 1.6 -2.3 
Osijek-Baranja (OB) -0.5 0.7 -1.2 
Lika-Senj (LS) -0.2 1.6 -1.8 
Koprivnica-Krievci (KK) -0.1 0.7 -0.8 
Split-Dalmacija (SD) 0.3 0.4 -0.1 
Brod-Posavina (BP) 1.5 1.3 0.2 
Vukovar-Srijem (VS) 1.6 2.3 -0.7 
Bjelovar-Bilogora (BB) 2.1 1.8 0.3 
Šibenik-Knin (SK) 2.3 1.5 0.8 
Virovitica-Podravina (VP) 8.6 7.6 1.0 
Sisak-Moslavina (SM) 12.8 5.1 7.7 
Karlovac (KA) 19.6 7.6 12.0 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Decomposition is based on the Shapley value approach, using formulas (13) and (14), where the poverty measure P 
is the poverty gap (FGT1). Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. Boldface figures are 
statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level; statistical significance is assessed based on asymptotic standard errors. 
 
 
As already noted in Section 4, when we switch from FGT0 to FGT1, many counties 
change their poverty ranking relative to the national benchmark, as well as relative to one 
another. While in the case of FGT0 eight counties were less poor than the nation as a 
whole, now that poverty is measured by FGT1 there are thirteen such counties. Seven of 
them are the same counties as in the case of FGT0 (Istra, Krapina-Zagorje, City of 
Zagreb, Primorje-Gorski Kotar, Međimurje, Zagreb, Dubrovnik-Neretva), while the 
remaining six are “newcomers” (Požega-Slavonija, Zadar, Varaždin, Osijek-Baranja, Lika-
Senj, Koprivnica-Križevci). Of these six, five are only insignificantly poorer than the 
entire country, just as they were so in the case of FGT0 (the only exception being 
Koprivnica-Križevci). The only newcomer county that is now significantly poorer than 
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the national benchmark is Požega-Slavonija. It changes rank from eighteen to six, that is, 
advances from the group of poorest to the group of least poor counties. There is only 
one county, Split-Dalmacija, that becomes poorer than Croatia as a whole, though not 
significantly so. 
 
Figure 6  Decomposition Results for the Poverty Gap 
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Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Decomposition is based on the Shapley value approach, using formulas (13) and (14), where the poverty measure P 
is the poverty gap (FGT1). Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. For full names of the 
counties, see Table 1. 
 
 
Considering the estimates of the income and inequality effects, note first that the income 
component for each of the counties is proportional to its value in the benchmark where 
poverty was measured by FGT0. Indeed, in Figure 7 (panel A), where income 
contributions for FGT0 are plotted against those for FGT1, the coefficient of correlation 
is very high, 0.97. Regressing the income contribution for FGT0 on the income 
contribution for FGT1, the slope coefficient is slightly greater than three (3.07), and the 
intercept is very close to zero, showing that the factor of proportionality between the two 
income components is about three. In the case of the inequality component, correlation 
is lower, 0.80 (Figure 7, panel B). This suggests that upon switching from FGT0 to 
FGT1, the inequality contributions change on average relatively more than the income 
contributions, so much so that we now have more counties where the inequality 
contribution dominates in absolute value the income contribution. While in the case of 
FGT0 there were only six such counties, now that we have switched to FGT1 there are 
thirteen out of twenty-one. Thus, one can conclude that by using FGT1 instead of FGT0, 
that is, by giving more weight to the poorer among the poor, the inequality contribution 
to regional poverty differences becomes on average more important than the income 
contribution. This is expected since, as we already showed, the Gini coefficient is 
correlated more strongly with FGT0 (Figure 2, panel B) than with FGT1 (Figure 3, panel 
B).  
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Figure 7  Correlation between the Income Contributions and between the Inequality 
Contributions for FGT0 and FGT1 
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Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. For full names of the counties, see Table 1. 
 
 
Regarding the signs of the income and inequality contributions, they are generally 
preserved. The sign of the income contribution must be preserved by definition, for if a 
county's mean income is below (above) the national mean income, the income 
component will be positive (negative), irrespective of the poverty measure used. This need 
not be so for the inequality contribution. However, in our case we observe sign reversals 
only in cases where the inequality contribution for FGT0 or that for FGT1 (or both) is 
not statistically different from zero. 
 
 
6.3 Results for the Squared Poverty Gap 
 
The last poverty measure we consider is the squared poverty gap, FGT2, which assigns 
even more weight to the poorer among the poor than FGT1. As we said in Section 3, 
unlike FGT0 which accounts only for the proportion of the population below the 
poverty line, and unlike FGT1 for which only the average relative shortfall of incomes 
from the poverty line is important, FGT2 is sensitive to inequality of incomes below the 
poverty line. In Figure 8, which shows the Gini coefficients among the poor, we see that 
inequality of incomes below the poverty line is lowest in Požega-Slavonija (6.4) and 
highest in Dubrovnik-Neretva (47.0). These values depart substantially from those for the 
whole distribution, displayed in the last column of Table 1. Given this fact, one can 
reasonably expect the poverty ranking of Požega-Slavonija to significantly improve and 
that of Dubrovnik-Neretva to worsen now that poverty is measured by FGT2 as a 
measure which accounts for inequality among the poor. 
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Figure 8  Inequality of Incomes below the Poverty Line 
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Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. For full names of the counties, see Table 1. 
 
 
The estimates of the total poverty differences and the income and inequality 
contributions are given in Table 6 and Figure 9. In comparison to what we had when 
poverty was measured by FGT1, the number of counties that are less poor than Croatia 
as a whole does not change: there are again thirteen such counties, five more than when 
FGT0 was used to measure poverty. However, while in the case of FGT1 seven total 
poverty differences were statistically different from zero, now there are twelve of them. 
There are again many rerankings, and some of them are quite remarkable. For example, 
Dubrovnik-Neretva, which was less poor than the nation as a whole according to both 
FGT0 and FGT1, now becomes poorer than the total population, though not 
significantly so. The worse ranking is a direct consequence of the nature of poverty in 
this county: in comparison to the whole country, it has a lower share of people below the 
poverty line, but incomes of the poor are much more unequally distributed. The example 
of Požega-Slavonija should be mentioned again. This county was the fourth poorest 
county according to FGT0, then it became the sixth among the least poor counties upon 
switching from FGT0 to FGT1, and now its ranking is improved even more: according 
to FGT2, only Istra and Krapina-Zagorje are less poor. This indicates that the nature of 
poverty in Požega-Slavonija is such that there are relatively many people below the 
poverty line, but their incomes do not fall very much short of the poverty line, and 
inequality among the poor is low. 
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Table 6  Decomposition Results for the Squared Poverty Gap 
 
Total poverty difference 
(ΔP) 
Income contribution 
(G) 
Inequality contribution 
(I) 
Istra (IS) -2.7 -0.7 -2.0 
Krapina-Zagorje (KZ) -2.7 0.0 -2.7 
Poega-Slavonija (PS) -2.5 1.3 -3.9 
Meðimurje (ME) -2.0 0.1 -2.0 
City of Zagreb (CZ) -1.8 -0.7 -1.1 
Primorje-Gorski Kotar (PG) -1.7 -0.4 -1.3 
Zagreb (ZG) -1.7 -0.3 -1.4 
Koprivnica-Krievci (KK) -1.2 0.3 -1.5 
Zadar (ZD) -1.1 0.4 -1.6 
Osijek-Baranja (OB) -1.1 0.3 -1.4 
Lika-Senj (LS) -1.1 0.7 -1.8 
Varadin (VA) -1.0 0.7 -1.8 
Vukovar-Srijem (VS) -0.1 1.1 -1.2 
Brod-Posavina (BP) 0.0 0.7 -0.7 
Šibenik-Knin (SK) 0.7 0.7 -0.1 
Dubrovnik-Neretva (DN) 0.8 -0.3 1.1 
Split-Dalmacija (SD) 0.8 0.2 0.6 
Bjelovar-Bilogora (BB) 1.2 0.9 0.3 
Virovitica-Podravina (VP) 3.4 3.6 -0.3 
Sisak-Moslavina (SM) 9.8 2.6 7.2 
Karlovac (KA) 15.2 4.3 10.9 
 
Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Decomposition is based on the Shapley value approach, using formulas (13) and (14), where the poverty measure P 
is the squared poverty gap (FGT2). Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. Boldface figures 
are statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level; statistical significance is assessed based on asymptotic standard 
errors. 
 
 
Figure 9  Decomposition Results for the Squared Poverty Gap 
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Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Decomposition is based on the Shapley value approach, using formulas (13) and (14), where the poverty measure P 
is the squared poverty gap (FGT2). Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. For full names of 
the counties, see Table 1. 
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Figure 10  Correlation between the Income Contributions and between the Inequality 
Contributions for FGT0 and FGT2 
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Source: Own calculation based on the Household Budget Survey data for 2010. 
Notes: Incomes are equivalized using the modified OECD equivalence scale. For full names of the counties, see Table 1. 
 
 
Turning to the estimates of the income and inequality contributions, the most notable 
result is that the inequality contribution gets even more dominant over the income 
contribution than it was the case with FGT1. While the inequality contribution was 
dominant for thirteen counties when poverty was measured by FGT1, here we have 
domination for fifteen counties. This unsurprising result stems from the already 
mentioned fact that in addition to inequality in the whole distribution, FGT2 is sensitive 
to inequality of incomes below the poverty line. Correlation between the income 
contributions for FGT2 and FGT0 (Figure 10, panel A) is just slightly weaker than 
between the income contributions for FGT1 and FGT0 (Figure 7, panel A): it falls from 
0.97 to 0.93. However, if we compare the correlation between the inequality contributions 
for FGT2 and FGT0 (Figure 10, panel B) with the correlation between the inequality 
contributions for FGT1 and FGT0 (Figure 7, panel B), we observe a bigger decline: from 
0.80 to 0.67. Thus, the switch from FGT0 to FGT2 induces strengthening of the 
inequality contribution, relative to the income contribution, more than the switch from 
FGT0 to FGT1.  
 
In sum, comparing the results obtained in the case where poverty is measured by FGT0 
with the results obtained by the two alternative poverty measures from the FGT class, a 
shift in dominance from the income toward inequality contribution is clearly observed. 
The results do not come as a surprise, given that the three measures capture different 
aspects of poverty. 
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7 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
The existing literature on empirical poverty analysis abounds with decompositions of 
intertemporal poverty differences into the “growth” and “redistribution” components. 
Although the conceptual framework that is commonly used in those decomposition 
exercises can be equally well applied to decompositions of spatial poverty differences, that 
is, between countries or regions within a country, there are surprisingly few studies on 
this topic. In this paper, we aimed at contributing to this literature by studying 
differences in relative poverty between Croatian counties in the year 2010, using the 
standard decomposition framework based on the Shapley value.  
 
Utilizing three poverty measures, where each accounts for a different aspect of poverty, 
we showed that the way one measures poverty affects significantly the results of 
decompositions of spatial differences in poverty. For the most common poverty measure, 
the headcount ratio, the results show that regional differences in the average income are 
the principal determinant of regional headcount poverty differences. This, however, does 
not mean that the inequality component should be neglected: although the income 
contribution is dominant for most of the counties, the inequality component is also 
significant and in some cases even dominates the income contribution. The results 
change substantially when we switch from the headcount ratio to the other two measures, 
namely the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap. First, there are many poverty 
rerankings of counties relative to each other, and some of them change their rank quite 
remarkably, suggesting that the nature of poverty varies across counties. Most 
importantly, unlike in the case of the headcount ratio, the inequality contributions 
become dominant over the income contribution, especially when the squared poverty gap 
is used to measure poverty. Thus, the results are not robust to the choice of poverty 
measure due to, as we already said, the varying nature of poverty across counties.  
 
This non-robustness of the results is the most important message in terms of policy 
recommendations that could be drawn from the decomposition exercise performed in 
this paper. Before poverty-reduction measures are devised, policy-makers should make 
clear what exactly their objective is. Do they aim at lowering the proportion of 
population below the poverty line (reducing the headcount ratio)? Or do they rather wish 
to bring the poor closer to the poverty line (reducing the poverty gap or the squared 
poverty gap, depending on how much weight is given to those at the bottom of 
distribution)? Once the objective is known, results such as those obtained in this paper 
could be used to see how much of the disparity between a region's and national poverty 
levels is due to the difference in average incomes and how much due to the difference in 
inequality. As can be seen from our results, the contributions of the average income and 
inequality depend to a large extent on the poverty measure used.  
 
Regarding further research, two avenues are especially worth exploring. First, this paper's 
analysis is just an accounting exercise: we estimate the income and inequality 
contributions of regional poverty differences without going into deeper analyses aimed at 
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understanding the economic and broader social forces underlying the results we obtain. 
More detailed analyses are needed if one wants to better grasp the pattern of regional 
poverty differences and the underlying mechanisms, especially so if the results are meant 
to be a guide for policy making. For example, it would be worth exploring sources of 
variations in the average income and income inequality across counties. Such analyses 
may help to reveal potential levers that poverty-reduction programs could rely on. 
Second, the poverty measures we use are scale-invariant, meaning that their values do not 
change when all incomes and the poverty line are multiplied by the same positive 
number. Alternatively, one may choose translation-invariant measures, whose values do 
not change when the same number is added to all incomes and the poverty line. By 
choosing scale-invariant poverty measures, we have also implicitly adopted the relative 
approach to inequality, according to which inequality does not change if all incomes are 
multiplied by the same number (i.e., if the ratios of incomes do not change). However, 
no less legitimate is the absolute approach to inequality, according to which inequality 
does not change if the same number is added to all incomes (i.e., if the absolute 
differences between incomes remain unchanged). Bresson and Labar (2007) show that the 
two approaches give different results which, in turn, lead to different recommendations 
when it comes to policy making. 
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